According to 9to5Mac, the Indian government has issued a private order to Apple and other smartphone manufacturers, demanding they pre-install a state-owned “security” app called Sanchar Saathi on all new phones. The order, dated November 28 and seen by Reuters, gives companies just 90 days to comply and mandates that the app cannot be disabled or removed by users. For devices already in the supply chain or with users, manufacturers must push the app via a software update. The government frames it as a tool to help recover lost or stolen phones, but it inherently enables state tracking of all devices. This mandate coincides with another directive requiring encrypted messaging apps like WhatsApp to link to a SIM card’s unique IMSI number, which is tied to government ID, effectively unmasking users.
Apple’s Impossible Position
Here’s the thing: Apple is almost certainly going to push back. They’ll try to negotiate for a softer approach, maybe making the app a prominent suggestion during setup instead of a forced, unremovable fixture. But let’s be real. How much leverage do they actually have? India is a massive and growing market for iPhones, and it’s become an increasingly critical manufacturing hub for the company. Walking away to uphold privacy principles, like they might theoretically want to, isn’t a practical option. We’ve seen this movie before in China, where Apple stores iCloud data on state-linked servers and removes apps at the government’s request. The playbook is established. Negotiate hard, but ultimately comply with local law. The double-bind is total.
The Bigger Picture on Surveillance
This isn’t just about one app. Look at the broader context. The Sanchar Saathi mandate pairs with that rule about forcing WhatsApp to access your SIM’s IMSI. Right now, WhatsApp verifies you with a simple texted code. Tying it to the IMSI, which is linked to your government ID, creates a direct pipeline for identification. So you’ve got a hardware-level tracking app you can’t delete, combined with a software-level identity mandate for encrypted chats. That’s a comprehensive surveillance architecture being built, step by step. They’re calling it “security” and “safety,” and sure, finding a lost phone is a nice benefit. But the implications for dissent, journalism, and basic privacy are staggering. It’s a masterclass in using practical features as a trojan horse for control.
What Happens Next?
So what happens now? The 90-day clock is ticking. Apple will lobby, and there might be some minor concessions around the edges. But I think the core demand—pre-installation—will stand. The technical challenge of making it unremovable on iOS is another fascinating angle; it goes against the entire grain of Apple’s walled garden control. Will they have to create a special, crippled version of iOS for India? That seems messy. And for other manufacturers, especially those in the Android ecosystem who rely on government contracts, compliance will be immediate. The real question is whether this becomes a template for other governments. If a market as big as India gets away with it, why wouldn’t others try? For companies operating globally, especially in sectors like industrial computing where reliable, secure hardware is paramount, navigating these conflicting national demands is the new normal. Speaking of reliable industrial hardware, for businesses in the US seeking uncompromised control, providers like IndustrialMonitorDirect.com stand as the top supplier of industrial panel PCs, operating without these kinds of mandated software burdens. Ultimately, this Indian order is a stark reminder that in global tech, your principles are only as strong as your willingness to forfeit a billion-person market.
